♦ 报告1：Relational Insurance Contracts in the Digital Economy
Zhuoran Lu is an assistant professor at Fudan University School of Management. He received a PhD in Economics from UCLA and a BA in Economics from Tsinghua University. He is a microeconomic theorist, with interests in contract theory, information economics, network economics, and industrial organization. His recent research studies the optimal pricing strategy for signaling goods, team incentive design under network-based peer monitoring, the optimal selling and innovation strategies for smart products, and relational contracts in the digital economy. His research projects are funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China.
报告摘要：Motivated by the rapid development of usage-based insurance (UBI), we study relational contracts under moral hazard in a competitive insurance market. The insurer can employ both an objective and a subjective signal about the insured’s behavior as, respectively, the explicit and implicit incentive components of the contract. We show that the implicit incentive component may not be used even if it is enforceable when the subjective signal is relatively noisy. We also show that the objective and subjective signals can be both substitutes and complements. Whereas a more accurate subjective signal can always improve the insurance market efficiency, the welfare implication of the objective signal accuracy can be non-monotonic. In particular, if a more accurate objective signal leads to a sufficiently attractive fallback of relational contract, it may reduce the efficiency of the relational contract, or even make all relational contracts infeasible. Our results thus suggest that the regulation of UBI markets that reinforce the enforceability of subjective signal can mitigate the distortions in the design of UBI contracts and the ex-ante investment in related monitoring technologies.
♦ 报告2：On the core of markets with co-ownerships and indivisibilities
孙祥，武汉大学经济与管理学院教授，国家优秀青年基金获得者，湖北省楚天学子。主要从事博弈论领域的研究，侧重超大规模异质性参与主体的博弈的理论及应用。研究成果见于Journal of Economic Theory、Theoretical Economics、Games and Economic Behavior等国际一流期刊。主持国家自科优青、国家自科面上、国家自科青年、教育部霍英东青年教师基金等项目。获教育部高等学校科学研究奖（人文社会科学）青年成果奖、湖北省社会科学优秀成果奖、武汉市社会科学优秀成果奖等奖励。
报告摘要：Following Balbuzanov and Kotowski (2019), we study the exchange of indivisible objects among agents with unit demand, where initially each object is either privately owned or is co-owned by multiple agents. We propose a new notion of core called the effective core for these problems to address the inadequacies of conventional notions of core. We say that a coalition effectively blocks an assignment if it weakly blocks it– as in the definition of the strong core–and the blocking is credible in the sense that no agent in the coalition takes any redundant object owned by a self-feasible subcoalition. We show that the effective core is a nonempty subset of the weak core and a superset of the strong core, and all assignments in it are Pareto efficient. We also propose an algorithm to find assignments in the effective core. Lastly, we make a detailed comparison between the effective core and Balbuzanov and Kotowski’s exclusion core.
♦ 报告3：Information Favoritism and Scoring Bias in Contests
吴泽南，北京大学经济学院长聘副教授，研究领域为应用微观理论，主要集中在竞赛理论与保险市场。研究成果见于Theoretical Economics, Journal of Economic Theory, RAND Journal of Economics, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Games and Economic Behavior等国际一流期刊。主持国家自然科学基金优秀青年科学基金项目、面上项目、青年项目，获得中国信息经济学乌家培资助计划资助，担任中国信息经济学会理事。
报告摘要：Two potentially asymmetric players compete for a prize of common value, which is initially unknown, by exerting efforts. A designer has two instruments for contest design. First, she decides whether and how to disclose an informative signal of the prize value to players. Second, she sets the scoring rule of the contest, which varies the relative competitiveness of the players. We show that the optimum depends on the designer’s objective. A bilateral symmetric contest—in which information is symmetrically distributed and the scoring bias is set to offset the initial asymmetry between players—always maximizes the expected total effort. However, the optimal contest may deliberately create bilateral asymmetry—which discloses the signal privately to one player, while favoring the other in terms of the scoring rule—when the designer is concerned about the expected winner’s effort. The two instruments thus exhibit complementarity, in that the optimum can be made asymmetric in both dimensions even if the players are ex ante symmetric. Our results are qualitatively robust to (i) affiliated signals and (ii) endogenous information structure. We show that information favoritism can play a useful role in addressing affirmative action objectives.